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This paper examines the impacts of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact (Compact) on the
Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program using an autoregressive-moving average
(ARMA) model and data from Boston and Hartford. While the results for Boston indicate that
the difference between the net fluid milk price paid by WIC program and the forecasted fluid
milk price with no Compact in effect was not significant over the period of July 1997 to June
1998, the results for Hartford suggest that the net price paid by WIC was significantly greater
than the forecasted price with no Compact in effect over the same period. A similar analysis
of the changes in markups suggests that the increase in the net fluid milk price paid by the
WIC program in Hartford was largely due to increased markups.
The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact (Com-
pact), as the first regional dairy compact in the
U.S., has been the focus of a great deal of attention
and speculation since its inception in July 1997
(Bailey and Gamboa 1999; Knutson 1999). De-
bates on renewal of the Compact have centered on
whether the Compact has kept retail milk prices
artificially high and whether it has really slowed
down the disappearance of dairy farms in the New
England region (Machacek 1999). To accomplish
its goals, the Compact has stabilized the price paid
by fluid milk processors at $1.40 per gallon since
July 1997 through a variable Compact over-order
premium (see figure 1). Although the Compact has
helped many farmers in the region, some observers
associate it with increases in retail milk prices in
the post-Compact period, especially in July 1997.
Figure 1 indicates that retail milk prices in Boston
and Hartford increased by about $0.20 per gallon at
the start of the Compact and then remained at lev-
els higher than those observed in previous years.
Such increases in retail milk prices have brought
about concerns from consumers and policymakers.
Retail milk price increases can have negative ef-
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fects on consumer welfare and can result in
changes in government programs such as the
Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program.
This study examines the impacts of the Compact
on the WIC program using data from Boston and
Hartford.
The WIC program was established in September
1972 to prevent anemia and inadequate growth that
were common among children of low-income
families. This federal program was designed to im-
prove the health status of participants by (i) assur-
ing access to health care and social welfare pro-
grams, (ii) teaching families nutritional practices,
and (iii) providing individually-designed nutritious
food packages. Eligibility for the WIC program is
based on residence, age, maternity status, income,
and medical or nutritional need. Fluid milk has
been a major food item of the WIC program. Ac-
cording to an estimate of the Food and Nutrition
Service of the USDA, WIC programs nationwide
spent an average of 3090 of their food budgets on
fluid milk in 1996.
The Compact was established as the result of a
provision of the 1996 Farm Bill. According to the
provision, the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact
Commission reimburses the WIC programs in the
Compact states by the amount of the Compact
over-order premium. This provision was designed
to prevent any increase in the net price paid for
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Figure 1. Monthly Class I, Compact, and Retail Milk Prices in Boston and Hartford
fluid milk by WIC programs in the Compact states.
However, because most WIC programs in New
England allow participants to purchase fluid milk
directly from retail stores, the net price paid by
WIC programs depends on both the Compact over-
order premium and any related changes in the retail
price. The net price paid by the WIC program will
not be affected only if the change in retail milk
price is equal to the Compact over-order premium.
This is unlikely because changes in the retail fluid
milk price are determined by many other factors
such as transportation and processing costs that
affect wholesaler and retailer markups.
Any increase in the cost of fluid milk would
increase the food package costs for WIC programs,
This could possibly result in a reduction in the
number of WIC program participants and/or a
change in the composition of food packages, As
shown in table 1, the number of WIC participants
in the six Compact states dropped slightly from
257,566 persons in June 1997 to an average of
256,894 in the next three months (July–September
1997), but then increased to an average of 266,844
during October 1997 to February 1998. While the
number of WIC participants decreased slightly in
Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island during
July 1997 to February 1998 and increased in Ver-
mont, Massachusetts, and Connecticut in the same
period, the total number of participants in these six
states increased slightly to art average of 263,113













































































for the July 1997 to February 1998 period, Al-
though these changes may be due to other factors,
they suggest that milk price regulation under the
Compact has not had any dramatic effect on the
number of WIC participants. Due to data limita-
tions, possible changes in the composition of food
packages of the WIC programs are not examined in
this study.
The main purpose of this study is to assess the
possible impacts of the Compact on the WIC pro-
gram, Specifically, this paper first examines
whether there has been any significant change in
the net fluid milk price paid by WIC programs in
the post-Compact period using retail fluid milk
price data from Boston and Hartford, and then tests
whether there have been any significant changes in
the levels of farm-to-retail price markups that
could have affected the net price paid by WIC
programs for fluid milk.
Data and Method
An autoregressive and moving average (ARMA)
model is constructed to depict the relationship be-
tween retail fluid milk prices, their past values,
past prediction errors, and other factors such as
Class I milk price. Results from this model can
provide evidence to answer the questions posed
earlier. This section first describes the data, then
presents the econometric specification of the
ARMA model, and finally identifies the hypoth-
eses to be tested.
Data
Three monthly price series were used in this study:
(1) retail fluid milk prices for Boston and Hartford,
(2) the Class I milk prices for Zone 21, and (3) the
Compact price (i.e., the Class I milk price plus the
Compact over-order premium). Since price regula-
tion under the Compact began in July 1997, the
Compact over-order premium set by the Compact
Commission is available only since July 1997.
While data from January 1990 to June 1997 were
used to estimate the models, data from July 1997 to
June 1998 were used to forecast the price and
markups with no Compact in effect, This study is
limited to Boston and Hartford due to data avail-
ability. Massachusetts and Connecticut account for
more than 60% of New England WIC participants.
An ARMA (p, q) Model of Milk Price
This section presents an autoregressive-moving av-
erage (ARMA) model that will be used to test the
impacts of the Compact on the WIC program. In an
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
ARMA model, the dependent variable, retail fluid
milk price, is a function of both its past values, past
errors and current and past values of other vari-
ables. The model can be used to examine the rela-
tionships and to forecast future values of the de-
pendent variable (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991;
Greene 1993). In order to investigate the changes
in the net fluid milk price paid by WIC programs in
Boston and Hartford, we consider the Class I milk
price for Zone 21 (PI), the Compact milk price
(Pc), retail fluid milk prices in Boston (PB) and
Hartford (PH), and the net price paid by the WIC
program (Pw). The relationships of these variables
can be expressed as follows:
(1) PC= P’+R,
(2) pj = pc + mJ
(3) PWJ= pJ - R,
where j = B for Boston and j = H for Hartford, R
is the Compact over-order premium set by the
Compact Commission, which did not exist during
the pre-Compact period, and mJ is the markup at
market j, which is defined as the difference be-
tween the retail price and Class I price in the pre-
Compact period and the difference between retail
price and Compact price in the post-Compact pe-
riod, R is also the reimbursement by the Compact
Commission to the WIC program (i.e., the Com-
pact over-order premium). Note that the net price
paid by WIC programs in the pre-Compact period
was equal to the retail price (i.e., PWJ = P). Then,
the retail price at market j is
(4) pJ=pc+mJ=(pI+R)+mJ
and the net milk price paid by WIC program at
market j is
(5) PwJ=PJ-R= (PI+ R)+mj-R=p]+mJ,
Equation (5) indicates that if there is no significant
change in the markup behavior between the pre-
Compact and post-Compact periods, the net price
paid by WIC programs for fluid milk should not
show any significant change. In other words, the
Compact did not affect the net price paid by WIC
programs if the increase in retail fluid milk price in
the post-Compact period was equal to the Compact
over-order premium. Thus our first task is to fore-
cast retail fluid milk prices in Boston and Hartford
that would exist assuming there was no Compact in
effect for the post-Compact period. For this pur-
pose, we estimate an autoregressive-moving aver-
age (ARMA) model of retail fluid milk price using
data from the pre-Compact period and then use the
estimated model to forecast retail fluid milk pricesWang et al. Impacts of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact on the WIC Program 107
Table 2. Estimation Results of the ARMA Model of Retail Milk Prices for Boston and
Hartford (Januarv 1990 to June 1997)
Boston Hartford
Process Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
Intercept 1.829** 0.149 2.118** 0.087
Autoregressive Parameters
z,-, 0.937** 0.055 0.901** 0.065
4-12 -0.051 0.059 –0.112** 0.060
Moving Average Parameters
%-1 0.307”” 0.134 0.395** 0.145
8t-l Z 0.095 0.148 -0.066 0.154
Class I milk price’
P? 0.261** 0.098 0.077 0.058
~_,I 0.043 0.100 0.083 0.058
Pt_,21 0.174** 0.084 0.090** 0.047
Estimate of Variance 0.0017 0.0004
AIC -311.23 -371.86.41
P:, P,_,’, Pt. 12[are the Class I milk prices in the current month, in the last month, and in the same month of the previous year.
**P < .05.
for the post-Compact period. The ARMA model of
a time-series process, y(t), can be represented by
(6)
where +(B) = 1 – @lB - @2B2–. . . -@PBp, O(B)
= l-t31B- 82B2-. ..-6qBq, &and0s are
autoregressive and moving-average parameters to
be estimated, X, is a vector of exogenous variables,
with or without lags, that affect the process Yt, and
~ is the corresponding vector of parameters to be
estimated. Note that B is the backward shift opera-
tor, i.e., Bkzt = z&k.
The procedures to investigate the impact of the
Compact on the net fluid milk price paid by WIC
programs are as follows: (a) Estimate the ARMA
model using data from the pre-Compact period, (b)
forecast the net retail, fluid milk prices for the post-
Compact period, PJ,*, based on the estimated
ARMA model, (c) calculate the net fluid milk price
paid by WIC programs over the post-Compact pe-
riod, Pwjt = P: – R, and (d) test the hypothesis
that the net price paid by WIC programs in the
post-Compact period is equal to the predicted price
without the Compact by com aring, Pwt and
$ PJt* (i.e., the null hypothesis is P ‘t = PJ,* and the
alternative is Pwjt # pjt*).
If the net price paid by WIC programs in the
post-Compact period is different from the pre-
dicted milk price with no Compact in effect (i.e.,
the null hypothesis is rejected), a major factor that
is likely to be responsible is a change in the mark-
ups of wholesalers and retailers. For this study, if
the null hypothesis is rejected, a similar ARMA
model will be used to predict the markups in the
post-Compact period under the assumption of no
Compact in effect and then test if the markups have
changed significantly in the post-Compact period
as compared to historical relationships.
Has the Net Price Paid by WIC Programs
Increased Significantly?
Since a model specification test suggests that there
is no integration of the process for both Boston and
Hartfod, an ARMA model rather than an autore-
gressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
model is used for the analysis of retail milk prices
in Boston and Hartford. The orders, p and q, of the
autoregressive-moving average (ARMA) process
are determined according to the Akaike Informa-
tion Criteria (AIC) (Greene 1993), As shown in
table 2, both the autoregressive and moving-
average orders of the process include 1-month and
12-month lags, which implies that the retail fluid
milk price is affected by its levels as well as the
unexplained disturbances in the last month and in
the same month last year, We also include the
Class I milk price as an additional explanatory
variable. It is specified in the model with its values
in the current month, the previous month, and the
same month in the previous year. The estimation
results suggest that the estimated models fit the
data very well.
Estimates of the first-order autoregressive pa-
rameter are 0.937 for Boston and 0.901 for Hart-
ford, and both are significant at the 0.95 level. This
implies that the retail fluid milk price in any par-
ticular month is significantly and positively af-
fected by its level in the previous month. The es-108 April 2001 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Impacts on the Net Price Paid by the WIC Program in Boston and Hartforda
Boston Hartford
Net Price Net Price
Retail Paid Forecasted Retail Paid Forecasted
Year Month OOPb Price by WICC Retail Priced Differencee Price bv WICC Retail Priced Differencee
1997 January 2.42 2.42 2,37 2,51 2,51 2.48
February 2.45 2.45 2,39 2,49 2.49 2.48
March 2.45 2.45 2,44 2.49 2,49 2.48
April 2.45 2.45 2,46 2.49 2,49 2.49
May 2.45 2.45 2,46 2,49 2,49 2.49
June 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.49 2,49 2.49
July 0.259 2,64 2.38 2,43 +0.05 2,68 2,42 2.48 +0.06*
August 0.255 2,63 2.37 2.44 +0.07 2.68 2.42 2.47 +0.05
September 0.245 2,63 2.39 2.46 +0.07 2.68 2.44 2.47 +0.03
October 0.141 2.62 2.48 2.50 +0,02 2.68 2.54 2.48 -0.06”
November 0.078 2.63 2.55 2.53 +0.02 2.68 2,60 2.49 -0.11*
December 0.273 2.63 2.56 2.52 -0,04 2.68 2.61 2.48 -0.13*
1998 January 0.064 2.60 2.54 2.48 -0.06 2.68 2.62 2.46 –0.16”
Febrrrary 0.035 2.59 2.55 2.47 -0.08 2.68 2.64 2.45 -0.19*
March 0.039 2.60 2.56 2.48 -0.08 2.68 2.64 2.45 -0.19*
April 0.033 2.60 2.57 2.49 -0.08 2.68 2.65 2.45 –0.20”
May 0.077 2.60 2.52 2.48 -0.04 2.68 2.60 2.44 –0.16*
June 0.146 2.54 2.39 2.44 +0.05 2.61 2.46 2.42 -0.04
‘Based on estimates of the ARMA model over January 1990 to June 1997,
bThe Compact over-order premium per gallon, which is calculated by dividing the over-order premium per cwt by 11.6.
‘Equals the retail price minus tJre 00P.
‘Predicted values for the pre-Compact period.
‘The difference between forecasted retail price and the net price paid by WIC. Positive numbers indicate that the predicted prices
without the Compact are greater than the actual net prices paid by the WIC programs and the negative numbers indicate that the
predicted prices without the Compact are less than the actual net price paid bv the WIC programs. .-
‘Significant at the 0.95 level.
timate of the 12ch-order autoregressive parameter is
negative for both cities and significant only for
Hartford. It means that the price level in the same
month of the previous year plays a role of damp-
ening the large effect of the one-month previous
level on the current price level, The estimated pa-
rameter for the Class I milk price at the current
month is positive for both cities but significant for
Boston only. The parameter of Class I milk price in
the previous month is not significant and the pa-
rameter of Class I price in the same month in the
previous year is significant for both cities.
Based on the estimation results in table 2, we
obtain forecasts of retail fluid milk prices (P*)
over the post-Compact period under the assump-
tion of no Compact was in effect and that there was
no exogenous shock in retail prices, The results of
forecasts are presented in table 3 for Boston and
Hartford. The actual net price paid by WIC is the
retail price less the Compact over-order premium
(OOP). The difference between the forecasted re-
tail price and the actual net price paid by the WIC
programs indicates how the actual net price paid by
WIC programs differed from what would have
been expected during July 1997 to June 1998 with-
out the Compact. If the difference is positive and
statistically significant, it implies that the net price
paid by WIC programs is significantly lower than
what would be expected based on historical rela-
tionships between the retail fluid milk price and the
Class I milk price. However, if the difference is
negative and statistically significant, it implies that
the net price paid by WIC programs is significantly
higher than what would be expected based on the
historical relationships. A difference that is not sta-
tistically significant implies that we can not deter-
mine the difference although it may exist. Any
negative and statistically significant differences are
of greater interest because higher net prices to WIC
programs may adversely affect the cost of WIC
programs and milk availability to program partici-
pants,
For Boston, the actual net price for fluid milk
paid by the WIC program is not statistically sig-
nificantly different from the price predicted by the
model in the absence of the Compact (figure 2).
This suggests that the net price paid by the WIC
program in Boston, within the limits of statistical
uncertainty, was not significantly affected by the
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Figure 2. Actual & Predicted Retail Milk Price and the Net Price Paid by WIC Program in
B;ston
the net price paid by the WIC program was sig- vides evidence that the net price for fluid milk paid
nificantly lower than the predicted value in the first by the WIC program in Hartford during much of
month of the Compact but significantly higher than the first year of Compact was higher than would
the predicted value during most of the remaining have been expected based on historical relation-
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Figure 3. Actual & Predicted Retail Milk Price and the Net Price Paid by the WIC Program in
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Table 4. Estimation Results of the ARMA Model of Markups in Boston and Hartford
(January 1990 to June 1997)b
Boston Model Hartford
Process (z,) Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
Intercept 1,656** 0.161 2.035** 0.093
Autoregressive Parameters
zt_, 0.945** 0.046 0,827** 0.093
Moving Average Parameters
&t_, 0.338”* 0.127 0.249 0,249
Class I Price’
P; -0.630’” 0.101 –0.861** 0.062
P,- ,‘ 0.078 0.093 -0.081 0,059
P,-l*’ 0.153* 0,076 -0.092 0.049
D 0.095 ** 0.038 0.051** 0.019
Esti;ate of Variance 0,0012 0.0004
AIC -296,25 -377.02
‘P;, P,_,’, P,–12’are the Class I milk prices in the current month, in the last month, and in the same month of the previous year,
Do, is a dummy variable, which equals one for all the months since January 1997 and zero for other periods.
*P”< ,10., **P-< .05.
Have the Markups Changed Significantly?
As discussed in the previous section, changes in
retail fluid milk prices in the post-Compact period
are likely due to at least two major factors: changes
in milk price paid by milk processors due to the
Compact over-order premium and changes in
markups. Because the net price paid by WIC in
Hartford over the post-Compact period was signifi-
cantly higher than the forecasted price with no
Compact in effect, we now examine whether there
has been any significant change in the markups of
wholesalers and processors in Hartford. The analy-
sis of markups helps to explain the underlying rea-
sons for changes in the net price paid by WIC. For
the purpose of comparison and examining the
methodology, a similar analysis is also conducted
for Boston.
Similar to the ARMA analysis presented in the
previous section, we examine the changes in mark-
ups using an ARMA (1,1) model. Table 4 presents
the estimated model for Boston and Hartford. For
both cities, estimates of autoregressive parameters
are significant. The estimates of the moving aver-
age parameter are significant only for Boston. To
explain the markup process, we included some ad-
ditional explanatory variables: levels of the Class I
price in the current month, previous month, and the
same month of the previous year, and a dummy
variable (D97) that equal 1 for months since Janu-
ary 1997 and O otherwise. The dummy variable is
to capture the jump in markups in early 1997. Es-
timates of the dummy variable are significant and
positive for both cities as expected. The current
level of Class I price has a significant and negative
effect on the markups. This is consistent with the
observations that the mark-up of wholesalers and
retailers is generally negatively related to Class I
milk prices.
One way to examine whether there has been a
change in markups is to compare the observed
markups with the markups that would have been
expected given a change in processors’ fluid milk
cost. To do this, we compare the observed markups
with the markup that our model predicts given the
increased cost of fluid milk to processors under
Compact price regulation, Based on historical re-
lationships, the model predicts that an increase in
the cost of fluid milk to processors will result in a
decrease in the markups, at least in the short run.
Thus, based on historical price relationships, the
increase in milk prices paid by processors due to
the Compact over-order premium is predicted to
result in a decrease in markups.
While a decrease in predicted markups in Hart-
ford when price regulation under the Compact be-
came effective in July 1997 is shown in figure 4,
the actual markups remained about the same level
as in previous months, despite the increase in the
cost of milk to processors. The difference between
the predicted markups and the observed markups
was statistically significant for Hartford for the
whole period (July 1997 to June 1998). This pro-
vides evidence that retailers and wholesalers in
Hartford changed their markup behavior at times
during the Compact took effect, Retailers and
wholesalers maintained their markups for fluid
milk by raising retail milk prices when price regu-
lation under the Compact took effect, rather than
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Figure 4. Actual Mark-up and the Mark-up Predicted with the Compact Price for Hartford
1990 to mid-1997. The results for Boston, not pre-
sented in this paper, indicate that the difference
between the predicted markups and the observed
markups was statistically significant for only the
first two months of the Compact.
Given the evidence of changes in markup be-
havior by wholesalers and retailers, we wish to
examine whether the actual markups differed from
the markups that would have been expected in the
absence of Compact price regulation. The differ-
ence between these two quantities provides addi-
tional evidence about the changes in the net price
paid by WIC, as indicated by equation (5). To
make this comparison, we calculate the difference
between the actual markups and the markups pre-
dicted with our model using the Compact price as
the cost of fluid milk to processors. Consistent with
the results for the analysis of the net price paid,
there is no statistically significant difference be-
tween the actual and predicted values of the
markup in the Boston market. Thus, there is little
evidence from our analysis of markups that the net
price paid by the WIC program in Boston in-
creased after the onset of Compact price regula-
tion.
In Hartford, however, the story is different. The
actual markups in Hartford were statistically sig-
nificantly higher than the predicted values (figure
4). This provides evidence that the net price paid
by the WIC program was higher than it would have
been in the absence of the Compact. Because our
markup models were estimated using Class I price,
one possible argument may be that the markups
should be predicted using the Class I price rather
than the Compact price. To address this concern,
we calculated the predicted markups using the
Class I price for both Boston and Hartford. As
expected, the predicted markups using the Class I
price are higher than that using the Compact price
due to the negative relationship. While there is no
change in the conclusion for Boston, the results for
Hartford indicate that, during the first three months
of the Compact price regulation, the predicted
markups were statistically significantly higher than
the actual markups (figure 5). From November
1997 to May 1998, however, the actual markups in
Hartford were statistically significantly higher than
the predicted values. The analyses summarized in
figures 3 to 5 together indicate that the higher net
price paid for fluid milk by the WIC program in
Hartford resulted from higher than predicted mark-
ups in the Hartford market.
Conclusions
Milk price regulation under the Compact has been
in effect since July 1997. Although its main objec-
tive is to improve the sustainability of dairy farms,
it has been associated with increases in the retail
fluid milk price, particularly during the first month
of price regulation. This study examines two pos-
sible causes of the increases in retail fluid milk

















Figure 5. Actual Mark-up and the Mark-up Predicted with the Class I Price for Hartford
effects on the WIC programs. In genera, the total
number of WIC participants in the Compact states
decreased slightly in the first three months of the
Compact but increased over the October 1997 to
February 1998 period. This suggests that the num-
ber of participants in WIC programs has not been
significantly affected by the Compact. However,
we do not have data to examine whether the com-
position of food packages and the nutrient sources
have been changed.
Our statistical models suggest that the retail
fluid milk price and markup behavior changed sig-
nificantly in the first two months of the Compact in
Boston and for most of the months in Hartford. For
Boston, the analyses of retail prices and markups
indicate that there was no statistically significant
difference between the actual net price paid by
WIC and the net price predicted in the absence of
the Compact. This provides evidence that reim-
bursement of the Compact over-order premium by
the Compact Commission is helping to avoid an
increase in the cost of fluid milk to Boston WIC
programs. However, for Hartford, both the retail
price and markup models indicate that the net
prices paid by the WIC program were greater than
the predicted values from November 1997 to May
1998. Thus, despite reimbursement of the Compact
over-order premium, it appears that the WIC pro-
gram in the Hartford area paid higher net prices for
fluid milk than it would have in the absence of the
Compact.
These higher net prices resulted primarily from a
change in markup behavior by wholesalers and re-
tailers in the Hartford market after Compact imple-
mentation. A possible explanation for the differ-
ence between Boston and Hartford is the differ-
ences in market concentration and competition—
the Boston market may be more competitive or
more efficient and therefore both the retail fluid
milk price and the markups are relatively lower
than that in Hartford. Future studies can benefit
more explicit treatment of these factors.
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